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Introduction 
Until the early 1960s, economists largely ignored 
the effect of inflation on the prices of corporate 
equities. Since revenues and costs were thought to 
be proportionately  affected by changes in the price 
level, profits would expand so as to keep pace 
with inflation. As residual claims to the earnings of 
corporations, equities were seen as partial, if  not 
complete, hedges against the effects of inflation. 
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, 
this notion was shattered. Despite a 95.2 percent 
rise in the consumer price index (CPI) from the 
end of 1966 to the end of 1977, the Standard & 
Poor's Stock Index rose only 2.4 percent. The 52.5 
percent decline in the real value of equities over 
this period led to the development of many the- 
ories to explain the relationship between equity 
prices and inflation. 
Among the most widely received 
theories was one offered by Franco Modigliani and 
Richard Cohn (1979). They claimed that investors 
make valuation errors by ignoring the gains debt- 
ors experience fkom inflation and therefore use 
the wrong measure of profits in pricing equities. 
Since inflation implies that the principal of the 
loan will be paid back in "cheaper"  dollars, lend- 
ers require an inflation premium in the coupon 
on the loan. This suggests that a part of the firm's 
debt service is used to maintain the real value of 
the firm's debt and should not be treated as an 
expense. Traditional accounting measures, how- 
ever, treat the entire debt service as an expense. 
Modigliani and Cohn claimed that the measure of 
"true profits" consistent with rational valuation 
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would equal accounting profits, plus the portion 
of the interest expense attributable to inflation. 
They reasoned that a more serious 
investor error involves the comparison of the dis- 
count rate for a pure equity stream with nominal, 
rather than real, interest rates. In figure 1 we pre- 
sent a time-series plot of the nominal interest rate 
on Aaa-rated corporate bonds and the earnings/ 
price ratio of stocks in the Standard & Poor's 
Stock Index. At least since 1960, these two series 
track one another well. Because long-term nomi- 
nal interest rates are thought to be largely deter- 
mined by inflation expectations, this comparison 
by investors further erodes the level of stock 
prices in an inflationaty environment. 
Modigliani and Cohn showed that, 
in the absence of market imperfections, the real 
value of the firm should remain unaffected by 
anticipated  inflation. Using a statistical model, 
they found that investors had indeed committed 
one or both forms of valuation error. 
In this paper, we review the model 
introduced by Modigliani and Cohn and the 
alternative analyses of other investigators. We 
then evaluate those analyses by examining the 
behavior of the rate of return required on equi- 
ties from 1953 to 1985. Surprisingly, we find little 
evidence of valuation errors. In particular, we 
note that when reported earnings are adjusted in 
the manner prescribed by Modigliani and Cohn, 
capitalization rates for equities appear to follow 
real interest rates, though they may also respond 
to factors related to aggregate risk. 
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I.  A Fundamental Valuation Model 
Fundamental equity valuation models assume 
that the goal of the firm's management is to max- 
imize stockholders' wealth. Projects are accepted 
only if they increase the market value of the 
equity, that is, if the present discounted values of 
the expected net cash flows from new projects 
are positive. The market value of the firm's equity 
is found by discounting the cash flows distributed 
to stockholders at the rate stockholders could 
earn on alternative investment flows of equivalent 
risk.'  The distribution to stockholders, or divi- 
dend, equals profits (revenue, less operating 
expenses and investment expenditures) minus 
interest payments on the firm's debt. 
Following Modigliani and Miller 
(1958), we make assumptions sufficient to derive 
an expression for the value of the firm's equity: 
a) capital markets are frictionless, that is, partici- 
pants can borrow or lend at the riskless rate of 
interest and there are no taxes; b) the social costs 
of bankruptcy are zero; c) all firms are in the 
same risk class; and d) equity and default-free 
debt are the only types of claims on firms. 
EARNINGS/PRICE  RATIO  FOR  THE  S&P STOCK  INDEX  AND 
MOODY'S Aaa-CORPORATE RATE 
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Note that if the adjusted profits of the firm are 
expected to grow continually at a rate g, the 
firm's value can be represented as: 
Given the above assumptions, Modigliani and 
Miller go on to show that a firm's value is inde- 
pendent of its capital structure. That is, rational 
investors will ignore the effects of the firm's bor- 
rowing and base their valuation on the firm's cash 
flow from operations. The levered firm's total 
market value, Vl(t),  is defined as the sum of the 
market values of equity, S(t),  and debt, D(t)  : 
The adjusted profits available for distribution to 
the stockholders of a levered firm differ from an 
unlevered firm's adjusted profits at date t, X(t),  by 
the firm's interest expense, rD(t).  The expected 
rate of return to the levered firm's stockholders, i, 
is simply: 
Combining equations (1) and (3), Modigliani 
and Miller's Proposition 1 states that: 
Substituting (5) into (4) and allowing for earn. 
ings growth at rate ggives: 
where d =  D (t)/S(tt),  is the firm's debt-equity 
ratio. The value of the equity of a levered firm 
can then be found by discounting the income 
stream available to stockholders at the appro- 
priate rate (given by equation [6]  ). That is: 
1950  1955  1960  1965  1970  1975  1980  1985 
SOURCE:  Moody's lnwstors Ssmlw; and  Standard & Poor's Corp.  (7)  S(t)  =  [X(t)  -  rD(t)]/[p  +  (p-r)d  -g] 
FIGURE 1 
The value of an unlevered (all 
equity) firm at date t, Vu(t),  with expected 
adjusted profits Xis found by discounting the 
firm's expected available net cash flow at the rate 
that is appropriate for the firm's risk class 
(p).2 Viewing the firm as an ongoing concern 
with a perpetual income stream X, its value is 
given by: 
......................................... 
This should be distinguished from the so-called book value of  1  equity. found by subtracting the book value of  liabilities from the 
book  value of assets. 
Following Modigliani and Cohn, suppose that at 
time t=  0 there is no  inflation and that imme- 
diately thereafter hlly anticipated inflation begins 
at the rate p and continues forever. Adjusted prof- 
.......................................... 
'Adjusted profits' refer to after-tax reported profits adjusted for the  2  efiects of  inflation on inventory valuation and the value of actual 
depreciation deductions. In the NlPA these adjustments are referred to 
as 'IVA' and 'CCadj.'  respectively. They are based on corporate tax 
records and assumptions about asset lives and replacement costs.  For a 
discussion of the NlPA adjustment, see Grimm (1982). A problem with 
applying this adjustment to the S&P reported earnings index is that the 
NlPA profits measure is based on "book" profits which vary somewhat 
from reported earnings, especially after 1981. 
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its will rise continuously at the rate of inflation so 
that at any date t, the unlevered firm's profits, X(t) 
will equal X(O)eP!  From equation (I), the value 
of the unlevered firm at date t, Vu(t),  equals 
Vu(0)eP! In other words, the realvalue of the 
unlevered firm will not be affected by fully antici- 
pated inflation. Rationally priced equity claims on 
such a firm are complete inflation hedges. 
Conventional accounting measures 
of a levered firm's profits are distorted by infla- 
tion. Accounting profits equal operating income, 
minus nominal debt expense. Assume that the 
nominal interest rate (R)  is approximately equal 
to the sum of the real interest rate (r) and the 
expected inflation rate (p) and that the firm's 
debt remains fured in real terms (~[t]  equals 
D[O] ep').3  Also assume that the firm's debt is 
structured so that it always pays the current rate 
of interest. The levered firm's accounting profits, 
II, can then be written as: 
The firm's accounting profits have been 
expressed in this form to illustrate the following 
essential points. 1) The portion of reported inter- 
est expense attributable to inflation, pD(O)eP{ 
should be added back to accounting profits to 
yield "true" profits. 2) At  high enough inflation 
rates, accounting profits may become negati~e.~ 
True profits, II*, will therefore in- 
crease at the fully anticipated inflation rate. That is: 
Substituting the levered firm's true profit stream 
II*, into equation (7),  we have: 
Equation (10) therefore indicates that the real 
value of a firm's equity is unaffected by inflation. 
Now substituting for accounting profits and rear- 
ranging, equation (10) becomes: 
This expression reduces to: 
Equation (13) shows that, although the real value 
of a firm's equity should be unaffected by infla- 
tion, accounting earnings must be adjusted for 
inflation's effect. 
Modigliani and Cohn hypothesized 
that investors failed to incorporate inflation in 
their valuations of equities. They tested this 
hypothesis by regressing a measure of stock prices 
on variables that enter either the numerator or 
the denominator on the right-hand side of 
expression (13). Their estimate of the coefficient 
on inflation implied systematic misvaluation. In 
our attempts to replicate the results of Modigliani 
and Cohn, however, we found that the results 
were sensitive to assumptions regarding lag dis- 
tributions used to construct proxies for ex-ante, 
or expected, values of key variables. In addition, 
our attempts to replicate the results of Modigliani 
and Cohn yielded a coefficient on inflation that 
differed fi-om their estimate (see Appendix). 
Rather than update their empirical work, we take 
a different approach to evaluating the perfor- 
mance of Modigliani and Cohn's model.5 
We utilize observable, ex-post 
observations on each of the relevant variables to 
simulate the model, calculating implied values 
for p, the required real rate of return of a pure 
equity stream. To the extent that our measures of 
greflect expectations, our estimate of p is an ex- 
ante  required rate of return on a pure equity 
stream. Consequently, p is analogous to a real 
interest rate, adjusted for the risk in equity and 
the fact that the security is a perpetuity. 
By focusing on the time-series 
values of p, implied by the model rather than the 
predicted equity values, we avoid much of the con- 
troversy surrounding equity valuation having to 
.......................................... 
3 
If, as finance theory suggests, investors are concerned with after- 
tax real rates of retum, then one could replace R=r+p with 
R"R(1-~)=r+p,  where T  is the marginal tax rate on interest income. 
Clearly, fixing r implies that the change in R* due  to a change in p  is not 
1 for  1. This relates to Hendershott's (1981) argument discussed below. 
4 
An additional factor that is thought to offset the inflation-induced 
gain from debt service, p~(0)eP: is the possible increase in the 
firm's pension obligations. This argument requires that inflation be unan- 
ticipated and is relevant only for defined-benefit  pension plans (currently 
comprising roughly 75 percent of  all pension assets). A defined-benefit 
pension is one in which contributions are determined by the benefits 
they will eventually yield. The  obligation of  the firm to restore under- 
funded pensions, however, rests in part on the nature of the firm's con- 
tract with labor.  Feldstein and Morck (1983) find that the stock market 
appears to react favorably to firms with overfunded pensions and nega- 
tively to underfunded pensions. They note, however, that most large, 
well-managed firms have traditionally had overfunded pensions. 
15 
An empirical update of Modigliani and Cohn is presented by 
(13)  s(t) = n(t)/[p + (p-r)d - pd  -  gl  Townsend  (1986). 
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The advantage of  this approach is that we are 
able to see how p varies over time and, in partic- 
ular, if  it is correlated with inflation or real inter- 
est rates. This does not contradict the assumption 
that at any point in time, all variables in the 
denominator of  (13) are expected to remain con- 
stant forever. While Modigliani and Cohn 
assumed that p is not affected by inflation, the 
theories discussed below allow p to be related to 
many factors, including the rate of  inflation. 
In order to isolate p we can re- 
write equation (13) as: 
Using the definition of  the nominal interest rate, 
R, we have: 
Equation (15) shows the relation between the 
required real rate of return on a pure equity 
stream in a given risk class and mostly observable 
variables. The only unobservable variable is the 
expected growth rate of  reported profits. The var- 
iable p may be viewed as a modified earnings/ 
price ratio, adjusted for inflation, leverage, and 
earnings growth. 
11.  The Determinants of  p 
Below we discuss three theories of  the determi- 
nation of  the cost of a pure equity stream. Two of 
the explanations given for the behavior of  p focus 
on a risk premium, while the third considers the 
relation between p and the real rate of  return on 
bonds. 
In trying to explain the behavior of 
the stock market in the mid-1970s, Burton Malkiel 
(  1979) adjusted corporate profits for inflation's 
effect on corporate debt and found them to be 
steady in low- and high-inflation periods. He 
argued that the decline in real stock prices was 
caused by an increase in the risk premium 
embodied in the rate of return required by 
stockholders. The increased risk premium was 
due to economic developments of  the early 
1970s that led to a departure from the relative 
......................................... 
6 
The emphasis on p is also justified by the implications of work 
done by Shiller (1981) and others on the volatility of dividends 
and stock prices. The literature on stock volatility suggests that profits 
have much lower variances than stock prices. Thus,  variation in p and 
other factors influencing the rate at which profits are discounted could 
be expected to account for much of  the variation in stock prices. 
stability of the 1960s. He reasoned that investors 
thought policyrnakers could no longer "fine tune 
away" economic fluctuations and that long-run 
planning involved greater uncertainty. Although 
profits rose with the price level, their dispersion 
across industries also rose, in turn raising busi- 
ness risk. The rising use of debt financing was 
another source of  increased risk for the financial 
system. Finally, rising government regulation may 
have been perceived as reducing profitability. 
As evidence supporting the per- 
' 
ception of  increased risk, Malkiel cites the rise in 
the "risk spread" between anticipated returns on 
equities and long-term government bonds, as 
well as between the yields on Baa-rated corporate 
bonds and government bonds. These widening 
spreads throughout the 1970s may suggest that 
investors believed the credit quality of firms was 
falling. According to Malkiel's findings, we would 
expect to see a path for p that starts out low in 
the '50s and '60s and then turns higher in the 
mid-to-late 1970s. 
A related theory of the behavior of 
p involves the possibility of a disinllationary dis- 
tress premium: real required rates of return on 
pure equity streams rise in a climate of  disinfla-  5 
tion. Firms may be under greater strain in a disin- 
flationary environment as they are often unable to 
match declines in revenue with declines in 
expenses.'  This is particularly evident following a 
period of  prolonged high inflation. Extreme 
examples of  the upheaval associated with disin- 
flation can be found in the oil and steel indus- 
tries. Further, corporate defaults have generally 
been higher in disinflationary periods than in 
inflationary periods.8 This hypothesis implies that 
stockholders will require a premium whenever 
there are large reductions in inflation in order to 
compensate them for the increased credit risk. By 
this hypothesis, p should fall with increases in 
inflation and rise with disinflation. 
Hendershott (1981) attributes the 
valuation error noted by Modigliani and Cohn 
solely to investors' comparisons of the expected 
real yield on equities, p, with the nominal yield 
on bonds. He claims that Modigliani and Cohn's 
....................................... 
7 
This may be due to the existence of fixed labor and supply con- 
tracts. A simple model introduced by Wadhwani (1986), on the 
other hand, suggests that the inflation premium in a levered firm's debt 
service causes nominal debt expense to increase proportionately  more 
than nominal revenue during inflation, forcing the firm to report lower 
accounting profits. Conversely, this expense will decrease more than 
proportionately during disinflation, resulting in higher reported, or account- 
ing, profits. 
8 
Fons (1986)  investigates the correlation between "unanticipated 
changes in the consumer price index and a measure of expected 
corporate default rates embodied in yield spreads. Though not statisti- 
cally significant, the relationship between inflation surprises and an 
implied default premium on low-rated corporate debt is negative. 
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model implies that the after-tax real bond yield 
falls as a result of inflation, while nominal yields 
remain constant. Since bonds and equities are 
substitute assets, the fall in the after-tax real yield 
on debt would lower the rate of return required 
by stockholders. The decline in the required 
yield on equity offsets the overpayment of  taxes 
resulting from the inflation-induced understate- 
ment of depreciation and inventory costs (see 
discussion of  Feldstein  [I9801 below), or 
increased risk premia noted by Malkiel, leaving 
the nominal value of stocks essentially 
unchanged. Hendershott claimed that there were 
other factors responsible for the decline in the 
real value of equities. First, there was a decline in 
savings due to lower real after-tax yields. Second, 
there was a decrease in the productivity of  new 
capital due to higher regulatory costs and higher 
energy prices. In addition, Hendershott felt that 
an increase in the realized rates of return on non- 
corporate assets, such as residential housing, may 
have induced investors to reduce their holdings 
of  debt and equity. 
By Hendershott's reasoning, p 
should decline in inflationary periods and rise 
with disinflation. Declines in productivity, how- 
ever, would be reflected in a lower expected 
growth rate of earnings (g). 
-- 
COMPUTED p SERIES  WITH  ONE-PERIOD  ACTUAL  EARNINGS  GROWTH 
1950  1955  1960  1965  1970  1975  1980  1985 
SOURCE: Flgun8 2. 3. and  4 author's calculations. 
FIGURE 2 
111.  Data & Methodology. 
Quarterly observations for the period covering 
1953 through 1985 on each of the following data 
series were used to construct estimates of  p: ad- 
justed earnings per share, stock prices, nominal 
corporate interest rates, aggregate debt-equity 
ratios, and earnings growth. The values for stock 
prices and earnings were taken from the Standard 
& Poor's Index. The price index, based on as 
many as 500 different equities mostly traded on 
the New York Stock Exchange, is constructed in 
such a way that, when divided into the associated 
earnings index, the unwanted weighting factor can- 
cels. The earnings-per-share index is constructed 
from the reported earnings over the past four quar- 
ters of the firms in the corresponding stock index. 
We adjust for inflation-caused inventory valuation 
and depreciation errors by multiplying the earn- 
ings index by the ratio of adjusted-to-reported 
after-tax profits found in the National Income and 
Product Accounts (NIPA)  (see footnote 2). 
The interest rate on corporate bor- 
rowings is measured as Moody's cross-sectional 
average yield on single A-rated bonds. This rating 
corresponded to the average quality rating (in 
terms of  par value) of all publicly traded corpo- 
rate debt as of December 1985. As was previously 
discussed, the nominal interest rate embodies 
inflation expectations. In using this measure, we 
avoid the problems encountered by Modigliani 
and Cohn in constructing an econometric proxy 
for expected inflation. 
The debt-equity ratio for nonfinan- 
cia1 corporations, 4 was constructed from two 
sources. Data covering 1953 to 1961 was taken 
from Von Furstenberg (1977), in which the 
market value of debt is inferred from a present 
value relation. The 1961 to 1985 series for the 
market values of corporate debt and equity were 
constructed by the Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System. In this case, the market 
value of debt is found by pricing all mortgages 
and long-term bonds at the average price of 
bonds traded on the New York Stock Exchange, 
ignoring such nontraded items as deferred taxes, 
leases, and pension obligations. An attempt was 
made in the estimation of the market value of 
equity (the listed values on all exchanges, times 
the number of corresponding shares outstanding) 
to avoid the double counting of firm ownership 
through stock holdings. 
The computation of  p involves 
assumptions about the process generating the 
parameter g. One extreme is to let g assume its 
realized value equal to the annualized growth 
rate of four-quarter reported earnings for each 
period. The volatile behavior of g and p when g is 
measured this way can be seen in figure 2. We 
feel that such erratic movement in g is unreason- 
able since, in theory, g is the expected perpetual 
growth rate of earnings. Presumably this pre- 
cludes g fiom being negative. 
An alternative way to measure g is 
to utilize a time-series model to construct an  in- 
sample one-period-ahead forecast of earnings 
growth. We  modeled the quarterly growth of 
four-quarter earnings as following an ARMA(1,l) 
process. Using the forecast for gat each date in 
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the calculation of  p yields the time-series plot of 
p presented in figure 3. This series is only slightly 
less volatile than the series constnicted from 
actual growth rates. 
COMPUTE0 p SERIES  WITH  ARMA(1,l) EARNING  GROWTH 
FIGURE 3 
A third alternative is to fur the 
growth rate of  earnings at its average value over 
the entire sample period, 6.4176 percent.9 This 
procedure may be justified on the grounds that 
investors somehow possess perfect foresight of 
earnings growth and that they ignore short-run 
fluctuations. The infinite-horizon nature of  the 
estimated model requires an unbiased estimate 
of  perpetual earnings growth. It is possible, with 
the S&P data, to construct an estimate based on 
earnings growth as far back as 1926. The inclu- 
sion of a persistent recession and a major war, 
however, would likely result in a less satisfactory 
estimate of  expected earnings. 







1950  1955  1960  1965  1970  1975 
FIGURE 4 
A time-series plot of p constructed 
with g fured at its average value is presented in 
figure 4. The required real rate of  return ranged 
between 10 and 13 percent fiom 1952 through 
1974, with moderate deviation. At the start of 
1975, however, p began to rise slowly and then 
sharply in 1981. It peaked at the end of 1981 and 
again at the beginning of 1984. For comparison's 
sake, setting g  equal to zero over the entire sam- 
ple period produces values for p ranging 
between 4.5 and 7.5 percent from 1952 through 
1976, topping out at 14.2 percent in mid-1984. 
IV.  Analysis of Computed p Series 
In this section, we analyze the behavior of  p, 
computed with expected earnings growth fured at 
its actual mean value. Our goal is to shed light on 
this component of equity valuation. By their 
nature, however, it is not possible to completely 
separate the implications of the various hypo- 
theses discussed above. 
The computed value of p appears 
to support Malkiel's hypothesis that p begins to 
rise in the mid-1970s due to the risk factors cited 
earlier. In addition, the rapid rise in 1981 could 
be explained by Bodie, Me,  and McDonald 
(1986), who concluded that there was a dramatic 
increase in the risk premium required in long- 
term bonds in the early 1980s. They attribute this 
to the switch in operating procedures by the 
Federal Reserve in late 1979. 
The disinflation hypothesis pre- 
sented earlier suggests that p should vary inverse- 
ly with the level of  inflation. In figure 5, we pre- 
sent plots of  p and the rate of inflation. Note that 
the major upturns in p appear to coincide with 
the inflationary peaks occurring in 1974 and again 
in 1981. Smaller, previous inflation spikes do not, 
however, seem to be accompanied-by any signifi- 
cant movement in p. 
The same figure can be used to 
examine Hendershott's claims. Conspicuously 
absent is the hypothesized decline in p as infla- 
tion rises. The lack of noticeable downward 
movement in p during rising inflation eliminates 
much of the support for his arguments. His main 
conclusion, however, that p is tied to the real rate 
of return on debt, can now be addressed. 
9 
The average annual growth rate of adjusted earnings over the 
sample period was 17.01 percent. The growth rate of this series 
since mid-1983 has been so  great as to completely dominate this figure. 
It was felt that the effects of  this adjustment could not have been rea- 
sonably foreseen over much of  the sample period and, in fact, should 
"wash" over the long run. We therefore chose to use  the average annual 
growth rate of unadjusted earnings in the computation of p. 
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COMPUTED p WITH  FIXED EARNINGS  GROWTH  AND  INFLATION 
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FIGURE 5 
REAL  Aaa-CORPORATE 8ONO  YIELD 
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SOURCE:  Moodv's lnwstors Service. 
FIGURE 6  A plot of m$ost real long-term cor- 
porate bond rates is shown in figure 6. This figure 
was constructed by simply subtracting 1 from the 
ratio of the gross yield on Aaa-rated corporate 
bonds to the previous year's gross inflation rate at 
each date. Note that real required rates of return 
on f~ed  income securities reached unprece- 
dented levels in 1981, the same year in which p 
significantly departs from its postwar behavior. 
Hendershott's hypothesis, therefore, appears to 
explain the sharp rise in p that occurred in 1981. 
However, it does not shed light on the moderate 
increase beginning in 1975, but it does help 
explain the slight decline in p that occurs 
between the end of 1971 and the end of 1974. 
Though separate from the risk- 
related hypotheses, Benjamin Friedman (1986) 
claimed that an increase in the government 
deficit, such as that beginning in early 1981, 
would drive down the realized rate of return on 
equity relative to either short- or long-term debt, 
thereby increasing the required rate of return on 
a pure equity stream. This theory then suggests 
that the rise in p is a function of deficits, thus 
explaining the sharp rise in 1981. 
Had we found no rational explana- 
tion for the behavior of p, we would have 
searched for evidence of measurement errors 
related to corporate earnings. For instance, Feld- 
stein (1980) claimed that biases in the tax system, 
rather than inflation-induced valuation errors, 
could explain the poor performance of the stock 
market. In particular, Feldstein emphasized that 
corporate capital depreciation deductions are 
based on historical, rather than current, costs. In 
inflationary periods, with a rising price of invest- 
ment goods, this implies that the real value of 
depreciation deductions declines. This, in turn, 
implies that taxable profits (net of depreciation 
deductions) rise, causing real after-tax profits to 
fall. Feldstein also pointed out that nominal 
rather than real capital gains are subject to capital 
gains taxes. This implies that even if the nominal 
value of equities increased at the inflation rate, 
the real after-tax yield on equities would decline. 
In contrast to Modigliani and Cohn, Feldstein 
viewed the stock market decline as a rational 
response to inflation. 
Modigliani and Cohn, in response 
to the criticism of Feldstein, discussed the possi- 
bility of tax biases due to inflation. They noted 
that other analyses of the interaction of inflation 
and taxes have ignored the fact that firms are not 
taxed on the portion of returns used to depre- 
ciate debt. They argue that this offsets the decline 
in real after-tax profits that results fi-om the 
decline in real depreciation deductions. They 
support this by noting that the share of corporate 
income paid as taxes has remained relatively con- 
stant in inflationary periods. In their empirical 
work, as well as in our construction of p, an 
adjustment factor constructed fi-om the National 
Income and Product Accounts was used that 
attempts to correct reported earnings for depreci- 
ation and invento~y  distortions caused by infla- 
tion. The NIPA adjustment, however, may mis- 
state the lagged response of tax shelters to 
inflation. In addition, the analysis is complicated 
further by the fact that much corporate debt is 
fured-rate  and thus debt yields do not adjust 
instantly to inflation expectations. 
In figure 7 we present both unad- 
justed and adjusted reported four-quarter earn- 
ings per share using the NIPA data. For the early 
part of the sample period the two series are virtu- 
ally identical. They begin to diverge at the end of 
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1972, with adjusted earnings falling somewhat 
ADJUSTED AND  UNADJUSTED EARNINGS PER  SHARE  below unadjusted earnings. The situation reverses 
30  dramatically, however, in 1983. At this point, ad- 
justed earnings climb far above unadjusted earn- 
25  ings. Further study may shed light on the sensitiv- 
ity of our results to the adjustment of earnings, 
especially for the period following 1981. 
20 
15  V.  Conclusion 
We conclude that equity prices respond rationally 
10  to such factors as real interest rates and risk. 
When we use the model of Modigliani and Cohn 
to compute the discount factor applied to a pure 
5  equity stream of a levered firm, we find no evi- 
dence of inflation-induced valuation errors. The 
0  evidence presented, however, is consistent with 
1950  1955  1960  1965  1970  1975  1980  1985  the hypothesis that disinflation influences the risk 
SOURCE:  Standard & Poor's Corp.:  and U.S.  Daprtment of  Commarce.  premium applied to pure equity streams. 
FIGURE 7 
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APPENDIX 
Reestimation of Modigliani and Cohn's Model 
In this section, we describe our attempts to repli- 
cate the results of Modigliani and Cohn and then 
to reestimate their model, extending the sample 
period through 1984. 
Modigliani and Cohn estimated the following 
regression, which is implied by expression (13), 
after taking the log of  both sides: 
The variable L is the lag operator and the 
parameters w 1 through w5 represent coefficients 
on the lagged terms of the five forecasted vari- 
ables. The distributed lag, wl(L)II(t), embodies 
the assumption that expected, or a-ante,  profits 
equal a one-sided distributed lag of  past profits. 
Profits were measured as described in the text 
and in Modigliani and Cohn. Although it is not 
unusual to view expected dividends as influenc- 
ing stock prices, Modigliani and Cohn include a 
distributed lag of dividends, w2(L)~mt),  on the 
grounds that dividends provide information 
about future profits. They then restrict the coeffi- 
cients of the distributed lag on dividends, so that 
a change in dividends has no permanent effect 
on firm value, given the history of profits. Divi- 
dends were measured as dividends per share for 
the issues in the S&P 500, adjusted as described 
by Modigliani and Cohn. &(L)LF/'  a distributed 
lag of  the ratio of  the labor force to employment, 
is included to provide a cyclical adjustment to the 
ability of past profits to predict future profits. The 
term DVF(t)  is included as a measure of  the risk 
premium entering the formulation of  p. Modigli- 
ani and Cohn measured DVFas the 15-year 
moving-average deviation of the unemployment 
rate from 4 percent.  We chose instead to use a 
12-quarter moving-average. The distributed lag on 
the nominal interest rate, uk(L)R(t),  and the dis- 
tributed lag on inflation, utS(~)P(t),  are included 
to measure the real rate, r( t), also a component 
of p. R(t) is measured as the new issue yield on 
AA corporate bonds. P(t) is measured as the 
annual percent change in the CPIU. 
We  used the current value and seven lagged 
values in each distributed lag. This choice of  lag 
length differed from that of Modigliani and ,Cohn, 
but seemed only equally arbitrary. We  maintained 
the following restrictions regarding the form of the 
distributed lags: a) the coefficients on profits sum 
to one, b) the coefficients on dividends sum to 
zero, c) the distributed lag on LF/E is quadratic, 
d)  the distributed lag on dividends is linear, e) the 
distributed lag on the nominal rate is quadratic, 
and 0 the distributed lag on inflation is quadratic 
with the endpoints constrained to equal zero. 
The parameters to be estimated are d,  a3, A, 
Pi y,  and the parameters in the distributed lags. 
The theoretical model of Modigliani and Cohn 
implies that the coefficient  on the distributed lag 
of  inflation, y, should equal d/K  where dis the 
debt-equity ratio and Kis the capitalization rate. 
Their estimate of y, -0.08, differs from a com- 
puted value of d/K  0.05. Thus, an increase in 
expected inflation reduced market values, 
although this should not have been the case if 
investors had been rational. In fact, Modigliani 
and Cohn calculated that a one percent increase 
in inflation would reduce the market value of 
equities by 13 percent. Thus, the market had 
been drastically undemlued due to inflation- 
induced valuation errors. 
When we attempted to replicate the results of 
Modigliani and Cohn, over the same sample 
period, we estimated y to be .015. When the 
sample period was extended through 1984, how- 
ever, the estimate of y was -0.025. If  the misvalua- 
tion of equities was being eliminated, the esti- 
mate of  y over the longer period would have 
been closer to the theoretically predicted value 
(d/K)  than for the shorter period. Since our 
results not only differed from those of Modigliani 
and Cohn, but indicated worsening misvaluation, 
we chose to consider a different approach. 
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